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Fractured Territories and Abstracted
Terrains: Human Rights Governance Regimes
Within and Beyond the State
LARRY CATA BACKER*
ABSTRACT
The problem of representation has become a central element for the
development of human rights norms, not just within international
organizations, but within states as well. The problem has been made
acute by two significant changes in the organization of power that
became visible after the 1950s. On one hand, the idea of the individual
became more abstract. Mass democracy became symptomatic of a general
trend toward the dissolution of the individual within a mass population,
which was incarnated as the aggregation of its group characteristics, its
statistics, and data. On the other hand, states were becoming less solid;
the constitution of states, and of state power, formerly quite distinct in
their forms and secure within their territories, gave way to a polycentric
order in which national territory no longer defined and contained a
compulsory and singular legal order sitting atop a hierarchy of
governance. These two trends have had a noticeable impact, not just on
law and governance generally, but more importantly, on the way that
representation is understood and practiced. Today, the representation of
individuals has become more problematic at the national level as it gives
way to other bases of sovereign power derived from international norms.
At the international level the individual loses representative capacity.
The will of the consensus of states has supplanted that of the citizens of
the state in ways that may undermine the legitimacy of governance
systems. This paper considers the problem of representation within these
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intertwined phenomena. To that end, the paper considers the
manifestation of these two macrotrends in the context of the governance
of global business and human rights regulatory regimes. In the context of
the first trend, the problem of who legitimately represents is considered
within international organizations producing norms for transposition to
the domestic legal orders of states. The specific context will be the public
forums of the U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights. In
the context of the second, the problem of what is the object of
representation is considered at the national level, now the site of
transposition of international norms. The specific context is the rise of
multiple legal regimes each with a fidelity to a distinct representational
community. The boundaries of statehood have been redefined and with
them the nature and object of representation. Where states once existed,
territories serve as "bowls" in which several national legal orders may
operate through individuals and entities. Where international
organizations once served the community of states, they now serve as
vessels that contain mass interests re-incarnated as representative
organizations that produce or negotiate formal law and societal norms
for self-application. Within this context, simpleminded projects, and in
particular the move toward a single comprehensive public law treaty on
business and human rights, becomes an anachronistic exercise.
INTRODUCTION
Tyrant, avoid my sight,
Monster compact of spite,
Who rules by fear and force!
None can deserve a throne
Who worships hate alone,
Whose heart knows no remorse.1
In Handel's opera Giulio Cesare in Egitto, these words are uttered
by a disgusted Caesar, Rome's leader, to the representatives of Ptolemy,
mere king of Egypt, who, to court favor, presented Caesar with the
severed head of Pompey Magnus, who had sought sanctuary in Egypt,
oblivious to the fact that the Roman leaders, Caesar and Pompey, had
reconciled. The decapitation of a Roman by an Egyptian on Egyptian
soil sets in motion a course of events that eventually results in the
1. GEORGE FRIDERIC HANDEL, JULIUS CAESAR IN EGYPT, act 1, sc. 1 (Feb. 1724)
(original translation: "Empio, dir6, tu sei, togliti a gli occhi miei, sei tutto crudelta. Non
da re quel cuor, che donasi al rigor, che in seno non ha piet&.") (quoted in Janet Baker,
'Tyrant, Avoid My Sight, JANET BAKER SINGS FROM JULIUS CAESAR (Brian Trowell, trans.,
Chandos Record 2002)).
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representative of Rome deposing the king and incarnation of Egypt,2
installing another more to his liking. The aria, and the underlying story,
brings vividly to life the traditional and customary understanding, the
power and complexity, of representation and legitimacy within
governments, themselves arranged within hierarchies of power.
Legitimacy fuels the outrage of Caesar. Tyranny, monstrosity, fear,
force, etc., are all markers of illegitimate governance, the practice of
which strips Ptolemy of authority3-for authority is lacking in those
who do not legitimately represent.4 Together, these normative
constraints, complicated by their operation within multilevel authority
structures, present a great challenge to the organization and
implementation of power in contemporary emerging global orders.
This challenge is the central element of this essay: the problem of
representation and legitimacy, of who serves which volontg ggngrale.5
This problem now haunts national, and increasingly international,
public and private institutions that seek to wrap their actions in the
legitimacy of "representation" to assert authority on behalf of an
aggregation of represented "others." This essay considers how the
boundaries of statehood and of the reconstitution of sovereign authority
in the mass state have transformed representation, both as to the
representative herself (who is legitimately representative?) and as to
the persons and things being represented. This essay approaches this
inquiry by considering legitimacy and representation within a grid
bounded by the changing nature of the individual represented and by
2. Cf. ERNST H. KANTOROWICz, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL
POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957) (discussing the medieval political idea of the king's dual
existence in both a physical realm and a spiritual realm-whereby the king's spiritual
"body" would continue to represent his right to rule beyond his departure from the
physical realm).
3. The U.S. Declaration of Independence provides a legal-political application of the
sentiments compressed within the aria. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S.
1776).
4. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF HUMAN AND Cmc RIGHTS OF 26 AUGUST 1789, art. 6
(1789) (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/
bank mm/anglais/cst2.pdf ("The Law is the expression of the general will. All citizens
have the right to take part, personally or through their representatives, in its making. It
must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes.").
5. The general will is understood both in its continental sense, consolidated, though
by no means limited, to the conception articulated by Rousseau, see, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, Discourse on Political Economy, in ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: DISCOURSE ON
THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 163, 163-190 (Donald A.
Cress ed. and trans., Hackett Publishing 1983) (arguing that the political state is
conflicted in its service to the general will of the people by its duty to maintain its own
well-being), as well as in the Anglo-American sense of consenting to devolve power to a
government in which that power is fractured, see, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
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the changing environment of the national representative, both of which
affect the capacity of particular persons or institutions to represent, and
the scope and character of what is to be represented.
Part I briefly sets out a context within which to consider the
problem of representation in the construction of global business and
human rights norms. That context identifies two of the normative and
structural trends within which representation is understood and the
markers of legitimacy are attested. The first is the changed character of
the individual, who is being transformed from person to data and from
autonomous individual to part of an aggregated mass. The second is the
changed character of the representation, from a focus on the popular
will, however defined and identified, to an obligation of fidelity to an
international normative will developed through public and private
functionally differentiated organizations.
The essay considers the effect of fracture and reconstitution on
representation in the context of the governance of business and human
rights regulatory regimes,6 and principally the framework developed
through the United Nations (U.N.) Guiding Principles for Business and
Human Rights (UNGP).7 It examines recent efforts toward extending
and harmonizing global regimes of business and human rights
governance as they manifest within emerging governance orders inside
and beyond the state. Part II looks to the representation of individuals
and communities within international public and private governance
orders, which have effects within the domestic orders of states but also
constitute nonterritorial governance communities beyond the state. Its
focus is the legitimacy-challenging issue of representation within these
fractured territories of nonstate governance orders whose borders are
neither fixed nor physical. To that end, the paper considers the rise of
nonstate organizations where the governance of business is negotiated.
The specific context will be the public forums of the U.N. Working
Group on Business and Human Rights.8
Part III examines the challenge of representation as the crucial
destabilizing force for representational legitimacy in its second aspect-
the representation of law within states whose engagement with law is
now complicated by the logic of the emerging global system of public and
6. See generally SURYA DEVA, REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS:
HUMANIZING BUSINESS 152-200 (2012) (discussing the human rights standards that
multinational corporations should apply in their operation and also the manner in which
companies can be made accountable for violations).
7. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and
Remedy" Framework, U.N. Doc. HRIPUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on
Business].
8. See infra Part III.
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private governance.9 Its focus is the legitimacy-challenging issue of
representation in these abstracted terrains of the contemporary state,
which receive, as an abstracted general will of the international
community, the norms of nonstate governance orders in which the
individual is only abstractly represented. In this context, the paper
considers the extent to which the laws of multiple domestic legal orders
may operate simultaneously within a state. The specific context will be
the Republic of Bangladesh and the regimes of domestic and
international governance for business and human rights to which it is
subject. In Bangladesh, multiple regimes of governance rules for the
human rights conduct of business operate simultaneously, as
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and their value-chain partners may
be subject simultaneously to national law, the laws of the home state of
the controlling enterprise (often resident in China or in a member-state
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)), and the special regimes of bilateral and multilateral treaties
on investment and taxation. The Bangladeshi citizen is faced with
multiple representations, all of which assert authority over her life, and
few of which represent her. Each, though, might claim to act for her or
on her behalf. The European Union, representing its Member States
and their citizens, may exercise authority over enterprises operating in
Bangladesh, including regulation of the relationship between these
entities and those residents in Bangladesh. The enterprises themselves,
representing their shareholders and customers, may assert authority
over the Bangladeshi's employer and determine the quality of the
conditions in which she works and lives. Groups of enterprises
representing industry may assert authority to determine standards (for
example, for building inspection of factories) that are true to
international standards and are imposed on Bangladesh. Accords
reached with the United States and the European Union, each
representing their respective populations, may compel Bangladesh to
reform its labor laws to conform to standards deemed legitimate without
a corresponding consensus among the Bangladeshi population. The legal
territoriality of Bangladesh, then, becomes a far more complex terrain
than its geographic borders might suggest. One sees clearly here the
consequences of the operation of global markets on the organization,
identity, and authority of general will, complicating representation in
9. Cf. Daniel Augenstein & David Kinley, When Human Rights 'Responsibilities'
Become 'Duties' The Extra-territorial Obligations of States that Bind Corporations, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO
RESPECT? 271 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz, eds., 2013) (discussing the distinction
between "direct extra-territorial jurisdiction" and "domestic measures with extra-
territorial implications").
66 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:1
the face of distinct communities asserting authority and effectively
inverting the issue of representation and legitimacy. The consequences
for the legitimacy of law are profound. Law is domestically legitimate
only to the extent that it embodies a variable set of the general will of
communities beyond the state but acting within it. Mass democracy is
legitimate only in conformity to this higher popular will.
I. THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION
Decades before it was solidified as political theory by Enlightenment
elites,10 the issue of representation, even within the context of
eighteenth-century European absolute monarchies,1' was understood as
a foundational societal value grounded in custom and tradition so well
understood that it appears as a commonplace in opera libretti. This is
sometimes expressed in the idea of normative constraints on communal
will. 12 Much of the edifice of human rights is built on this notion. 13
Modern theory conceives of representation as variations of
operationalization of a social contract,14 grounded in consent,15 and, at
10. See, e.g., Patrick Riley, The General Will Before Rousseau, 6 POL. THEORY 485, 485-
86 (1978) (tracing the idea of the general will from Montesquieu to Rousseau).
11. This is not just limited to European absolutist monarchies of the 17th-18th
centuries. The concept of the "mandate of heaven" and its revocation are related. See
Dingxin Zhao, The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and
Contemporary China, 53 AM. BEHAN. SCIENTIST 416, 416 (2009) ("Performance legitimacy,
an aspect of state legitimacy neglected by Weber in his original formulation of the theory
of domination, played a particularly important role in the history of China and has shaped
not only the patterns of Chinese history but also today's Chinese politics."). There are
Biblical resonances as well. See 1 Samuel 15:1-34 (describing God stripping Saul of
kingship over Israel when he failed to obey Divine will). In both Chinese and Biblical
kingships, the emperor or king represented the Divine Will on Earth; the failure to
appropriately represent it precipitated the loss of legitimacy to rule.
12. See Larry CatA Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions: International and Religious
Transnational Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, 27 Miss. C. L. REV. 11, 24-37 (2008)
(describing transnational constitutionalism as a mechanism of control of national popular
will).
13. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW (1989) (examining the relationship between human
rights norms and customary laws in states and in the international forum).
14. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY
CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1689),
reprinted in POLITICAL WRITINGS 261, 309-323 (David Wootton ed., Hackett Publ'g 1993);
see also JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT
OF THE ARGUMENT OF TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1969) (advancing a historical
interpretation of Locke's Second Treatise).
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least with respect to the operation of the legislative and administrative
branches of government, usually on a fidelity to the constraints of
legitimacy bounded by an application of a volont gdndnale, a general
will.16 Together these constitute the contemporary basis of the
legitimacy of public power by grounding it as a representative xercise.
17
That consensus makes it as clear to the audiences of Handel's day as it
does for contemporary polities, that tyranny (arbitrary government) can
lose its legitimacy and thus its entitlement to rule when it ceases to
serve.18 Yet that basis of mass democracy grounded in the general will
and exercised through the representative organs of government
continues to discomfit modern political organization and its theorists.19
That discomfiture arises with respect to two challenges. The first is
the challenge of locating the object of representation (that is, who or
what is represented?). The second is the challenge of the identity of the
representative (that is, who can adequately represent those in whose
name authority is exercised?). In most modern republics, prevailing
institutional political expression frames these challenges,20 often in the
quasiconstitutional documents of states.21  But that institutional
expression of a normative organizational baseline for legitimate exercise
15. See, e.g., W.T. Jones, Rousseau's General Will and the Problem of Consent, 25 J.
HIST. PHIL. 105, 106 (1987) (examining how consent is an essential part of political
morality and the general will).
16. See, e.g., Ramon Flecha & Marta Soler, Communicative Methodology: Successful
Actions and Dialogic Democracy, 62 CURRENT SOC. 232, 232-235 (2014) (describing how a
sociological study sanctioned by the European Parliament achieved the acceptance and
political representation of the Roma people in Spain).
17. Despite the obvious temptation, this essay will not lose itself within the fascinating
and unfinished work of understanding, critiquing, defending, or faithfully applying some
version of what might be labeled a general will derived from, through, or around the work of
Rousseau and his contemporaries. For that, there is a mountain of Rousseau and related
scholarship. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF LEADING
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS (John T. Scott, ed., Routledge, 2006); TRACY B. STRONG, JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU: THE POLITICS OF THE ORDINARY (1994); MAURIZIO VIROLI, JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU AND THE 'WELL-ORDERED SOCIETY' (Derek Hanson trans.) (1988).
18. Cf. Weigang Chen, Confucian Humanism and Theodicy, 80 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION
932, 942 (2012) (claiming that a governing force is only legitimate if it possesses ufficient
merits as determined by the people).
19. Compare J. L. TALMON, I THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (1952), and J.
L. TALMON, I1 THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (1960) (discussing collective will
as the basis for "totalitarian democracy" characterized by pursuit of collective purpose),
with THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (claiming that majority tyranny and
structural fracture contain communal will in polyarchal democracy).
20. For a prescient discussion, see EDWARD HALLETT CARR, NATIONALISM AND AFTER
38-70 (1945).
21. This is nicely framed by the French Declaration of Human and Civic Rights,
DECLARATION OF HUMAN AND CIVIC RIGHTS OF 26 AUGUST 1789, art. 6 (1789) (Fr.), where
one notes the connection to the sovereign will.
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of power is itself challenged by the pull of a representative's fidelity, not
to a general will grounded in a population represented,22 but to an
institutional or normative will whose representation might override any
fidelity to the wishes of a represented population,23 or sometimes even
to custom and tradition.24 This, of course, touches on solidarity,25 beyond
the usual complexities of multiple fidelities to people, law, and
constitution common to elected officials in representative democracies.26
The twentieth century suggested a hierarchy of fidelity to these volontgs
gindrales even within the construction of a state, in which religious
values,27 natural law,28 and jus gentium29 all jostled for a place within a
hierarchy whose engine was the national government.30
22. See, e.g., David Stadelmann et al., Quantifying Parliamentary Representation of
Constituents' Preferences with Quasi-Experimental Data, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 170 (2012)
(studying the relation between the actions of political representatives with the voting
preferences of their constituents in the Swiss referendum process).
23. See, e.g., Travis Gettys, NC Republican Reveals His 'Primary Mission' as
Congressman: 'We're Here as Emissaries for Christ, RAWSTORY, July 14, 2015,
http://www.rawstory.com/2015/07/nc-republican-reveals-his-primary-mission-as-
congressman-were-here-as-emissaries-for-christ ("Pittenger said his chief priority as an
elected official was to promote Christianity to voters and other lawmakers. 'That's my
primary mission as a member of Congress,' he said. 'Yes, to serve my constituents, to serve
my region, and my state, and my country-but we're here as emissaries for Christ.').
24. The notions are nicely illustrated in JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE
(1956) (demonstrating examples of individuals who had the courage to remain loyal to
higher ideals in their political lives irrespective of the pressures of popular demands).
25. See generally HAUKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITY: FROM Civic FRIENDSHIP To A
GLOBAL LEGAL COMMUNITY (Jeffrey Flynn trans., MIT Press 2005) (examining the bond
between free citizens in the context of international law).
26. See SHEILA KENNEDY AND DAVID SCHULTZ, AMERICAN PUBLIC SERVICE:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS 108-14 (2011).
27. See, e.g., MARTIN E. MARTY, PROTESTANTISM IN THE UNITED STATES: RIGHTEOUS
EMPIRE 177-266 (2d ed. 1986) (describing Protestant experience in the 20th century); see
generally, A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 219-338 (1985)
(discussing the political and public expression of America's diverse religious beliefs);
James Davison Hunter, Law, Religion, and the Common Good, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1076
(2013).
28. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d. ed. 2011) (offering
a natural law theory framework that integrates questions in ethics, politics and
jurisprudence). See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Cornell Univ. Press 1955) (1928) (explaining natural
law's shaping of American society).
29. See, e.g., ANTONIo AUGUSTO CANCADO TRINDADE, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
HUMANKIND: TOWARDS A NEW JUS GENTIUM (2d rev. ed. 2013) (examining the current
humanization and universalization of the law of nations); Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of
Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 27 (1952)
(arguing for the heritage of jus gentium in the United States).
30. See Larry CatA Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global
Framework for Legitimate Public Power Systems, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 671, 676 (2009).
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Ordering, managing, and working within this marketplace of
general wills posed the deepest challenge to the state, and especially to
the legitimate expression of government that is representative of its
people both in the enactment and in the implementation of law
produced through the organs of state. Representativeness uggests a
notion both of legitimacy in consensus and of the nature of
representation in political institutions. With the end of the Second
World War, the victorious states, though divided into three camps
defined by ideology and colonial relations, all sought to strive toward a
consensus with respect to the normative framework within which
human organization could be structured.31 That consensus started with
the dismantling of the old colonialist ideology and the construction of a
new global order founded on the formal equality of states.32 It affirmed
the preeminence of politics over societal and economic regimes as the
basis for the operationalization of this emergent normative framework.33
Lastly, it embraced law as the most legitimate vehicle through which
operationalization could be manifested, both as the expression of rules
and as the basis for systems of compulsion, discipline, and
remediation.
34
Nearly half a century ago, Michel Foucault noticed two significant
changes in the organization of power.35 On one hand, states were
becoming less solid; the constitution of states, and of state power,
formerly quite distinct in their forms and secure within their territories,
were giving way to a polycentric order in which national territory no
longer defined and contained a compulsory and singular legal order
sitting atop a hierarchy of governance. The command-based regimes of
law, proceeding from the monarch or his successors in modern
democratic states, was increasingly augmented by the disciplines of soft
31. See Larry Catd Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions: International and Religious
Transnational Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, 27 MisS. C. L. REV. 11, 28-9 (2008)
(discussing roughly liberal democracies, Marxist-Leninist states, and theocratic states).
32. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/
charter ("The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.").
33. See id. at art. 1, para. 3 ('To achieve international co-operation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion ....").
34. See generally GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2010) (discussing the
relationship between law and social norms).
35. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE
COLLtGE DE FRANCE, 1977-1978, at 87-114 (Michel Senellart et al. eds., Graham Burchell
trans., 2007).
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power, and ultimately of biopower.36 Yet soft power itself was a
technique-a new means of insinuating one of any number of competing
general-will structures on and through a population37 that itself now
served both as the legitimating basis of power-exercises and as the
object on which they were practiced.
That shift both to soft power and to the population as
simultaneously object and method has also changed the character of the
object represented-from one focused on the individual to one focused on
the mass, and then from one focused on the mass to one focused on
conceptual frameworks. Indeed, the changes in the relations between
individual, norm, state, and law also produced effects on individuals.
The autonomous individual, a vessel for a host of rights and duties, was
becoming more abstract. The individual became insignificant in the face
of the mass of individuals that served as the fuel of the legal-
disciplinary mechanisms of state power. She became important only as
a point of data-a source of harvestable information from which the new
aggregated individual emerged: the population.3 Mass democracy
became symptomatic of a general trend toward the dissolution of the
individual within the masses. Within this reconstruction, the individual
acquired significance only as a subpart of the population, which in turn
was incarnated as an aggregation of the group and its characteristics,
statistics, and data. This was particularly apparent in the availability of
remedies for adverse human rights impacts that might affect
individuals within a population, and the availability of venues for
popular participation in the regulation of such adverse human rights
impacts. The individual disappears and is reconstituted as a
population-the focus of individual rights is transposed onto
aggregations of individuals. The individual no longer speaks for herself
to any appreciable extent, especially within discourses of human rights
in economic matters; she speaks only through institutionalized
individuals-the state, the nongovernmental organization, the
institutional voices of religion, or the multinational enterprise.
The problem of representation and legitimacy becomes a central
element here as well, but in a distinctive way. The representative,
whether exercising power internally within states or among states in
the international sphere, must first seek the object of representation
and then discern and apply its higher order (general) will. The
legitimacy of the representative herself, however, will depend on her
36. See 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 91-110 (1990) (Robert
Hurley trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990) (discussing the management of economic and
reproductive productivity through the organization of society).
37. See FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 87-114.
38. See id.
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capacity to represent, directly or indirectly, that object from which her
representative power derives. These two critical challenges of
representation-the question of whose will must be represented within
states, and the authenticity of representation by those who seek to
speak on behalf of the individual domestically and in the international
sphere-converge within the fractured governance territory of
globalization, and are particularly acute in the context of the
governance of economic activity within global chains of production.
The result is representational perversity and a more subtle double
form of potential delegitimation, which becomes particularly acute in
the framing of governance rules for the human rights effects of economic
activity. Norms and principles are elaborated among states where
individuals are at best indirectly, and often indifferently, represented.
Those norms and principles are then applied within the domestic legal
orders of states in which the authority of mass preference is
subordinated to the general will reflected in supranational norms and
principles now embedded within domestic legal orders. Polyarchal
democracy39 contributes to the tendency to subsume the individual
within faction,40 and factions as contributors to the general will of the
people expressed through the mediating principles of constrained
majoritarianism.41 People, as individuals or citizens, now abstracted and
denatured, are effectively removed from a human-rights enhancing
project undertaken on their behalf but without their participation. The
cover of formal connection between democratic national institutions and
this governance project does little to enhance the functional effects of
disconnected representation.
The consequence? Perhaps that monster compact of spite, who may
not deserve its throne,42 suggests the difficulties of legitimation of
human rights regimes decentered from sources of representational
legitimacy. Or it may suggest the monstrosity of people and the need for
greater fidelity to representation of higher-level concepts, leaving to the
masses only a limited range of implementation options. Where states
once existed, their territories now contain multiple legal orders, and
39. See DAHL, supra note 5, at 63-89.
40. See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 14 (James Madison) (describing the
dangers of faction).
41. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962); Susanna Mancini, The Crucifix Rage:
Supranational Constitutionalism Bumps Against the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 6
EUR. CONST. L. REV. 6, 24-7 (2010); Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the
Minority: Jim Crow and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
65, 67 (2008) ("The counter-majoritarian difficulty posits that laws are presumptively
legitimate as the fruit of the democratic process and majority will.").
42. See HANDEL, supra note 1.
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their legal territories are now divided among the abstract territories of
enterprises, organizations, and states that may operate within or
through their territories. Where individuals once existed as autonomous
political actors, their autonomy has migrated to representative bodies
and individual autonomy becomes a residual rather than a primary
value of social and political organization. International organizations
now not only serve the community of states, but also serve as vessels
that contain mass interests reincarnated as representative
organizations that produce or negotiate formal law and societal norms
for self-application. Within this context, simpleminded projects,
exemplified by moves toward a single comprehensive public law treaty
on business and human rights, become an anachronistic exercise
significantly removed from the realities of law and population in this
century. A purely state-centered conception of international human
rights law is dead.
II. FRACTURED TERRITORIES: REPRESENTING THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE
GLOBAL SPHERE
There appears to be a tradeoff of sorts within the political sphere.
This tradeoff is grounded in the centrality of mass democracy as the
foundation of all public legitimacy. Where there is a direct connection,
however flawed, between individuals in a community and their
representatives, those representatives may assert greater authority to
enact and enforce commands (usually through law or regulation). That,
of course, is the basis of modern constitutionalism43 and the legitimacy
of government.44 Those commands, that law, are maximally compulsory
when enacted through systems in which public power has been devolved
in this manner.45 Conversely, in the absence of such direct connections
43. See ROBERT SCHUTZE, FROM DUAL TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: THE CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN LAW 80-94 (2009) (detailing the decline of constitutional
exclusivity in post-1937 United States). See generally K. C. WHEARE, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONS (1951).
44. See, e.g., Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter art.
1, September 11, 2001, KAV 7230 ("The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy
and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it."). The
representational character of democratic ordering is also well understood: "The effective
exercise of representative democracy is the basis for the rule of law and of the
constitutional regimes of the member states of the Organization of American States.
Representative democracy is strengthened and deepened by permanent, ethical, and
responsible participation of the citizenry within a legal framework conforming to the
respective constitutional order." Id. at art. 2.
45. "It is the right and responsibility of all citizens to participate in decisions relating
to their own development. This is also a necessary condition for the full and effective
exercise of democracy." Id. at art. 6.
FRACTURED TERRITORIES AND ABSTRACTED TERRAINS
between individuals governed and the apparatus of those seeking to
govern, the authority to directly enact and compel obedience to rule
(however denominated) shrinks to practically nothing.
The operation of international law and its relation to domestic legal
orders reveal these poles in contemporary political structures. National
law is compulsory to the extent that it is legitimate, and it is legitimate
to the extent that it is appropriately enacted through the mechanisms
provided by those in whom representational authority has been vested.
International law, on the other hand, indirectly connected to
representational sources, is only indirectly applicable-it requires in
many jurisdictions a national act to transpose it from an obligation of
the state to one of general applicability. The direct connection between a
government and its citizens was at the core of the issue of legitimacy for
the American republic from its outset46 and has been an important
element in strengthening the legislative legitimacy of the European
Union.
47
This set of relationships is easy enough in the context of
conventional states or federal systems. But the individual loses
coherence as an element of mass democratic organization where the
polity falls away. In that context two questions arise-how does one
connect individuals to the mechanisms of norm or governance creation,
and who legitimately represents that individual thus constituted? These
issues become central to the problem of the authenticity and legitimacy
of international norm-making, which seeks to move beyond its role as
second-order rules (soft law) and have a more legitimately binding
character. This is a problem especially acute in the context of the
organizational structures for norm-making that were established in the
wake of the endorsement of the UNGP.
With the U.N. Human Rights Council's (HRC) 2011 endorsement of
the UNGP for implementing the U.N. "Protect, Respect and Remedy"
Framework,48 the HRC introduced a global standard for preventing and
addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked to
46. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803); cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 89 Official Court Reports 155
(Ger.), available at http://www.judicialstudies.unr.edu/JS_Summer09/JSPWeekl/
German%20ConstCourt%2OMaastricht.pdf.
47. This was bound up in the evolution of the European Parliament. 'The European
Parliament is an important forum for political debate and decision-marking at the EU
level. The Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by voters in all
Member States to represent people's interests with regard to EU law-making and to make
sure other EU institutions are working democratically." EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, About
Parliament: Welcome to the European Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eulabout
parliament/en (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
48. See Guiding Principles on Business, supra note 7.
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business activity. The UNGP are framed as three related governance
regimes or "pillars."49 The first pillar defines the state's duty to protect
human rights, a duty grounded in the international obligations of
states. The second pillar requires corporate responsibility to respect
human rights, grounded in the role of business as a specialized organ of
society. The third pillar defines an obligation to provide effective
remedies for breaches of human rights and seeks to match rights and
obligations to effective remedies. The object was to frame a polycentric
and interlinked governance structure,50 constructed around consensus
standards for business and human rights.51
As part of the mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) to lead the business and human rights agenda
within the U.N. system and to further elaborate the UNGP and their
operationalization, in 2011, the HRC established a "Working Group on
the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises."52 This Working Group, consisting of five
independent experts of balanced geographical representation,53 had its
mandate renewed for a three-year term in 2014.
54
The Working Group has become the center of the focus of
international public and private actors on the formal elaboration and
operationalization of the normative principles that are at the heart of
the UNGP, 55 and to do so both through action at the state level56 and
49. Id. at 1.
50. Cf. Bruce L. Benson, Polycentric Governance, CATO UNBOUND (Aug. 16, 2007),
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2007/08/16/bruce-l-benson/polycentric-governance; Mark B.
Taylor, The Ruggie Framework: Polycentric Regulation and the Implications for Corporate
Social Responsibility, 5 NORDIC J. APPLIED ETHICS 9, 21-22 (2011).
51. See JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 37-80 (2013).
52. See G.A. Res. 17/4, 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011).
53. Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM. RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/IssuesfBusiness/Pages/WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsando
therbusiness.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2015).
54. Id. (citing Human Rights Council Res. 26/22, Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 26th Sess., June 10-27, 2014, U.N. GAOR,
69th Sess., Supp. No. 53, A/69/53, at 187-90 (June 27, 2014), available at http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/142/68/PDF/G1414268.pdfOpenElement).
55. The mandate of the Working Group is broad and includes the following: the
promotion of the UNGP; the promotion of good practices from the implementation of the
UNGP; capacity building; monitoring through country visits; making recommendations to
improve the remedial function; the integration of a gender perspective throughout the
work of the mandate; the coordination with other U.N. special procedures; to develop
dialog within the U.N.'s organization; to guide the work of the Forum on Business and
Human Rights; and to prepare annual reports to the Human Rights Council and the
General Assembly. See id.
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within the global social sphere.57 It oversees what has become one of the
most important gatherings of global representatives of interested
stakeholders and stakeholder factions that have arisen around the
issues of business and human rights since the 1970s, the Forum on
Business and Human Rights held annually in Geneva.58 The Forum is a
self-styled "space for representatives and practitioners from civil society,
business, government, international organizations and affected
stakeholders to take stock of challenges and discuss ways to move
forward on putting into practice the Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights."
59
The Forum has grown dramatically since its beginning in 2012. The
Forum is an important venue for informal networking among the mass
of civil society organizations involved in the business of human rights,
and for states and large business enterprises to signal their intentions.
Indeed, the importance of the function of the Forum was recognized by
the Human Rights Council in extending the Working Group's mandate
in 2014.60
The Forum on Business and Human Rights has been an important
site, not only for debate about the evolution and application of the
UNGP, but also as a critical venue where stakeholders may engage in
the sort of factional politics that produce sometimes-substantial
movements in the activities and objectives of international
organizations. Perhaps the most important of such movements was the
factional effort that culminated in the creation of an intergovernmental
working group to elaborate an international, legally binding instrument
56. See infra Part IV (discussing the Working Group's consequences for
representation).
57. This focuses on the so-called second pillar: the responsibility to respect human
rights and the human rights due diligence responsibilities of business enterprises. See
generally Larry C. Backer, From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable
Governance: The Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the United Nation's
"Protect, Respect and Remedy" and the Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance,
25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 69.
58. See G.A. Res. 17/4, supra note 52, 12 (establishing a Forum on Business and
Human Rights to discuss trends and challenges in the implementation of the Guiding
Principles and promote discussion and cooperation on business and human rights issues).
59. The 4th Annual United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights, UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR Hum. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
Business/Forum/Pages/2015ForumBHR.aspx (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
60. Human Rights Council Res. 26/22, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises, 26th Sess., June 10-27, 2014, U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess.,
Supp. No. 53, A/69/53, at 187-90 (June 27, 2014), available at http:/ldaccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc[UNDOC/GEN/G14/142/68/PDF/G1414268.pdf?OpenElement ("[T]he annual
Forum on Business and Human Rights has grown in size and become a valuable
opportunity for constructive global exchange of challenges, lessons learned and good
practices in implementing the Guiding Principles by all relevant stakeholders ... ").
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on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with
respect to human rights.61 Beyond developing strong networks and
relationships among stakeholders, the Forum has become a body within
which global social norms are crafted--:or managed-with the object of
changing expectations of legitimate conduct, enterprise behaviors in
transnational space, and, more problematically, enterprise behaviors
within the domestic legal orders of states. Within the Forum,
particularly with respect to its role as a space for the generation of
governance standards, influence is the coin of the realm (sometimes
supported by status within the community of business and human
rights participants). Indeed, influence is a necessary substitute within a
governance organization where formal lawmaking is unavailable.
Yet the Forum's "space for representatives and practitioners"
presents a set of curious challenges for representation, and for the
construction of a representative body around the Forum itself. Both are
intertwined in the organization of the Forum itself. The construct
remains medieval, perhaps justifiably so in a community that is being
constructed outside the parameters of state organization. The Forum
remains an important gathering of a global estates general,62 a class-
based representative body drawn from the three "estates" into which the
"kingdom" of human rights society has been theoretically divided. But
there is no crown in this kingdom; its three estates-business, civil
society, and states-are given form and managed through the
organization of the United Nations, which serves as a legitimating space
within which this community can manifest itself. But these "estates
general" are not institutionalized, nor has their work been routinized;
their compaonents- remain-highly contested. .
The three institutionally structured stakeholdcer-estateis-re
relatively easy to understand in representational terms. States
represent themselves-and indeed, to the extent they find useful, every
61. See Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, Elaboration of an International Legally
Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Respect to Human Rights, 26th Sess., June 10-27, 2014, U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., Supp.
No. 53, A/2619, 1 (June 26, 2014), available at http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/082/52/pdf/G1408252.pdf?OpenElement ('The human
rights council ... decides to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group on
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights;
whose mandate shall be to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to
regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations
and other business enterprises.").
62. See, e.g., Owen Ulph, Note, The Mandate System and Representation to the Estates
General Under the Old Regime, 23 J. MODERN HISTORY 225, 226 (stating that, from the
14th to 16th centuries, medieval society experienced a transformation whereby direct
personal attendance and indirect attendance with proxies were replaced with
representation through elected delegates).
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state can participate in the Forum, and their interests are thus directly
represented. Business enterprises may also participate directly, and are
represented by business associations. Civil society represents itself as
well and can organize collective representation on an ad hoc basis.
These three estates share common characteristics. Each is a body
corporate, an aggregation of political, economic, or societal power which
operates collectively. Each is an abstraction incarnated, inherently
representational in its internal organization-states represent their
citizens, enterprises their shareholders and owners, civil society its
members. Each are representative in the sense that they represent
themselves. In so doing they also represent their members, and to some
extent they may be said to represent he members of their estates.
There is one "estate" whose presence is abstracted and only
recognized indirectly-the individual. The resulting representational
challenges become acute in two respects: first with respect to the
constitution of the individual as a mass stakeholder, and second in the
determination of the appropriate representative of this mass individual.
The individual appears as an abstract composite of statistics,6 3 or as a
symbolic victim extracted from particular occurrences, which members
of the other estates seek to emphasize.64 The individual is increasingly a
composite of the geographies of data, and the rights and remedial
obligations of states and enterprises are increasingly understood in
relation to these individuals reconstituted as aggregations of data with
differentiable characteristics.65 But the individual does not appear as a
represented force at the Forum.
The character of structures of norm-making at the international
level may make direct engagement impossible. First, all stakeholders in
such organizations are themselves aggregated composites-states, civil
society, and enterprises are all bodies corporate with internal
representational mandates. Second, participation in elite governance
structures, especially in the transnational sphere, requires a certain
discursive competence in the rules of interpersonal engagement and the
boundaries within which discussion may occur and action may take
place. It is impossible to expect the internalization of these sometimes
63. Cf. FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 87-114.
64. That was made clear by the sadly post hoc intervention of indigenous people for a
greater institutional role within the "estates general," either as an estate of their own or
by the expansion of the project of business and human rights to embrace their agendas.
65. Cf. Stephen Legg, Foucault's Population Geographies; Classifications, Biopolitics
and Government Spaces, 11 POPULATION, SPACE, & PLACE 137, 140-44 (2005) (arguing
that Foucault's approach spans the individual and the state, but also combines a
quantitative attention to statistics and numbers with a qualitative awareness of the
contingent nature of categories and the processes thdy claim to expose).
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subtle and complex rules of individuals who are at the bottom of social,
cultural, economic, and political hierarchies.66
The organizational logic of governance, then, suggests that the
individual may be represented through the organizational stakeholders
who comprise the estates general of governance organizations like the
Forum on Business and Human Rights. Individuals and vulnerable
communities are understood to be represented by states in accordance
with their constitutional and sovereign obligations under principles of
mass democracy. Individuals as part of the polity of states derive their
power through the mechanisms of authentic representation within
states, which they may, as a mass, hold accountable through election
and within mechanisms for engagement with the action of officials and
the constraints of law. Effective representation of individuals is
increasingly the object of civil society actors. Civil society restructures
polities along functionally differentiated interests. Each civil society
organization is self-constituted,67 and operates in abstracted territories
by representing its members and serving its objectives.68 Within these
organizations, the individual is represented in the context of the
interests and objectives served by the civil society apparatus. As there
are many variants of civil society, so an individual may choose to
embrace as many civil society organizations as she has the time,
resources, and stomach for. In some respects, even enterprises may be
said to represent individuals-particularly the investor and consumer
communities on whom they entirely depend for their existence.69
Enterprises certainly serve the interests of these individuals in the
context of the economic relations that bind investor and consumer to
producer and enterprise.
But in all three cases there may be significant failures of
representation. First, states may represent individuals within their
66. Cf. Andrew Rehfeld, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and
Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy, 103 AMER. POL. SCI.
REV. 214 (May 2009) (arguing that the usual formulation of the debate surrounding the
trustee/delegate problem collapses three distinctions-aims, source of judgment, and
responsiveness-and obscures the underlying complexity of the phenomenon).
67. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner et al., Debate and Dialogue: Constitutionalizing
Polycontextuality, 20 SOc. & LEGAL STUD. 210, 210 (2011) ("Constitutional problems arise
outside the limits of the nation-state in transnational politics and at the same time
outside institutionalized politics, in the 'private' sectors of global society.").
68. See generally Dieter Grimm, The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization,
12 CONSTELLATIONS 447 (2005) (discussing the effects that denationalization has on state
constitutions and their claims to comprehensively regulate political rule).
69. See Larry Catd Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of
Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739, 1759-
60 (2007) (noting that consumers' and investors' reactions to the actions of corporate and
financial institutions act as approval of those actions).
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polity, but they do not represent the mass of individuals that comprise
the global community of individuals with respect to whom international
norms are developed. This is an important problem not merely of
representation but of legitimacy. This problem was at the foundation of
the first and quite powerful attack on the legitimacy of federal states
and served as an essential impetus to grounding that legitimacy in
direct connection and representation between governmental apparatus
and individual.70 States may represent their polity, but they are
incapable of representing the mass of individuals over which norms are
constructed in the international sphere. It follows that this lack of direct
connection between a state and the mass of people divided among the
several states reduces the viability of state representation of the mass of
individuals. More particularly, at the international level, states may feel
obliged to further the undifferentiated interests of their governments, as
a result of which individuals and their needs may be understood solely
as matters of internal concern.
Second, civil society may advocate for but may not represent
individuals. The former suggests a hierarchical relationship between
civil society as advocate and the objects of its activity. Such advocacy
may be institutionally necessary for the maximization of the welfare of
the civil society institution in the worlds in which they operate, but it
tends to obliterate the individual, except as data input for policy.71 The
latter suggests a deeper and more horizontal fiduciary relationship, one
that might mimic the mechanics of the direct relationship between
electorate and government in states. Individuals are represented by
civil society only as members. But civil society advocates for
substantially broader groups of individuals, whom they also "represent."
Yet the objects of advocacy-representation may not even know of this
representation when advanced in venues like the Forum, or even of that
advocacy relationship itself. Representation through advocacy can
hardly substitute for conventional representation in the political sense.
The weakness of the substitution effect is apparent, especially where
70. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175 (1803) (holding that the establishment of the
federal government of the United States is by direct act of the people, rather indirectly by
act of the several states assembled in Congress).
71. Gabriel Moreno GonzAlez noted:
s(Un hombre, una c~lula; un conjunto de c6lulas, una ciudad>. Con este titulo sobrevolando
las mentes de los asistentes, dict6 en octubre de 1929 Le Corbusier una conferencia en
Buenos Aires sobre las nuevas tendencias del urbanismo. Para uno de los mayores te6ricecs
de la arquitectura contempordnea, un hombre no es mAs que un conjunto de c6lulas que,
agrupadas a su vez bajo las distintas formas de e(hombres), forman las ciudades.
Gabriel Moreno GonzAlez, Los Demonios del Hombre Aut6nomo y la Hybris Prometeica, A
PARTE RET. REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA 1, 1 (Nov. 2010) (Spain), available at http://serbal.pntic.
mec.es/AParteReilmoreno72.pdf.
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civil society seeks to speak for the groups on whose behalf it advocates
in governmental or quasigovernmental contexts.7 2 When advocacy is
viewed as the functional equivalent of representation, the
representational relationship resembles the relationship between
parent and child more than that between elected official and voter.
Dependency or service is hardly a legitimate basis for representation.
Third, enterprises, of course, are obligated to represent their
shareholders over other stakeholders. Individuals, like components and
raw materials, are viewed as factors of production, and corporate
interest must be directed to the higher project of maximizing the utility
of these factors in the production of wealth for shareholders. Enterprises
serve themselves, even when constructing self-constituting
governance.73  Enterprises, then, suffer the same problem of
representational egitimacy as civil society actors with respect to the
objects of their advocacy: in both cases, relationships cannot be
transmuted into representation on the strength of the relationship
alone.
The global mass of individuals, then, may not be represented
adequately by any of the conventional representational actors who are
commonly supposed to serve in the aggregate as representatives of, and
who stand in place of, the mass of individuals, the global population, in
international fora.74 The mass that is constituted of the mass-global
individuals situated beyond the state-must represent itself. Yet
orthodox approaches leave few possibilities for this. Conventional
approaches would revolve around some form of global government, one
with a direct connection between individual and the global apparatus of
government.75 And, indeed, these might well solve the problem of
72. Cf. Larry Cati Backer, Neo Colonialism in Civil Society Clothing or the Rise of
Human Dignity as the First Supra National Principle of International Law?, LAW AT THE
END OF THE DAY (May 13, 2008, 2:39:00 PM), http://1cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2008/05/
neo-colonialism-in-civil-society.html.
73. Cf. JH Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the
International Commercial and Financial Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria, 24
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 129, 135 (2006) (noting that the international business community
has been less likely to opine on the laws by which it is governed and that it lives in the
expectation that applicable law will protect it).
74. Cf. Bardo Fassbender, 'We the Peoples of the United Nations' Constituent Power and
Constitutional Form in International Law, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM:
CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 269 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker
eds., 2008) (examining the general question of the relationship between power and
constitutional form in the context of the international community).
75. See, e.g., MARTIN SHAW, THEORY OF THE GLOBAL STATE: GLOBALITY AS AN
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (2000) (arguing that globality is the growing sense of worldwide
human commonality as a practical social force, arising from political structure).
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representation of the mass of "global" individuals in supranational
forums.
What that leaves, then, in lieu of representation of the live bodies of
individuals, is abstraction and reconstitution along the lines that
produce states, enterprises, and civil society organizations, but with a
twist. It follows that data becomes the individual in the halls of the
transnational governance.76 Facticity and representation are derived
from the assemblage of numbers representing the incarnation of
individuals as a body, 77 and only as a body does the individual acquire
significance within the discourse of law, especially the law and
normative structures of human rights in business.78 As Nikolas Rose
recently noted, mass democracy and other mass engagements operate
on populations that have been calculated.79 As in democratic politics,
the politics of business and human rights has given rise not only to
actors who calculate and to regimes of the expertise of number; it has
also produced a governance discourse grounded in data and its
cultivation in which the individual is only known by her relation to a set
of legitimating statistics.8 0
Democratic power is calculated power, and numbers are
intrinsic to the forms of justification that give legitimacy
to political power in democracies. Democratic power is
calculating power, and numbers are integral to the
technologies that seek to give effect to democracy as a
76. See generally BRUCE CURTIS, THE POLITICS OF POPULATION: STATE FORMATION,
STATISTICS, AND THE CENSUS OF CANADA, 1840-1875 (2002) (discussing the developing
knowledge capacities of the state in Victorian Canada).
77. Cf. Scott M. Campbell, THE EARLY HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE: FACTICITY,
BEING, AND LANGUAGE (2012) (analyzing the concept of facticity and its relation to life and
language). See generally Martin Heidegger, ONTOLOGY-THE HERMENEUTICS OF
FACTICITY (John van Buren trans., Indiana Univ. Press 1999) (1988) (reviewing critical
appropriations of the hermeneutic tradition in order to formulate the question of being on
the basis of facticity in the everyday world).
78. Here the allusion is to being in the world. Cf. Evelyn S. Ruppert, I Is; Therefore I
am'" The Census as Practice of Double Identification, 13 SOC. RES. ONLINE 1.1 (July 31,
2008), http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/4/6.html ("Numbers occupy a privileged status in
modern political culture. Discourse and debates in the media, academia nd government
on everything from the economy and health to crime and immigration are often driven and
framed in reference to numbers.'.
79. Nikolas Rose, Governing by Number: Figuring Out Democracy, 16 ACCT. ORGS. &
SOC'Y 673, 675 (1991) ("[T]here is a constitutive interrelationship between quantification
and democratic government.").
80. See generally Larry Cati Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the
Governance Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101 (2008)
(discussing surveillance as a new form of lawmaking through which old boundaries
between the public and private, national and transnational, are not relevant).
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particular set of mechanisms of rule. Democratic power
requires citizens who calculate about power, and
numeracy and a numericized space of public discourse
are essential for making up self-controlling democratic
citizens.8 1
So it is as well in the context of the individual within systems of
business and human rights. The individual counts for very little. The
counted individual, however, serves a vastly important purpose, as both
the constructed object around which human rights is built, and as the
"type" for which remedy is available.
s 2
In this context, the mass individual, constituted as data, has no
vessel through which it makes its presence felt, through which it may
engage as representative of itself and its "demos." But the solution may
well be embedded in the limits of analogy. Where an aggregating
structure is absent, and representation required, it may then be the duty
of the institution within which such representation is required to
"speak"for the aggregated mass individual.
This requires devoting substantial efforts to the hard task of
representing them as they are, and doing so as to make these
individuals most accessible-through the data necessary to understand
the conditions, values, desires, and objectives of the groups to which
states, business, and civil society are obliged in the matter of human
rights. But data is precisely what is notable by its absence from the
discussions and politics of the Forum's estates general. John Ruggie
noted wisely that one can (to borrow a phrase from the Chinese) only
come to truth from facts.8 3 Yet it is those facts, that data, that now no
longer appears to have a significant enough space in these fora. No
place appears where the aggregated individual can shift position from
object-fractured into data subsets and constituted to provide a picture
of an object on which to act-to actor, either representing herself or
represented by an architecture of aggregating representation directly
81. Rose, supra note 79.
82. Cf. Evelyn Ruppert, Population Objects: Interpassive Subjects, 45 SOC. 218, 219
(2011) (noting that metrics enact populations by assembling different categories and
measurements of subjects-biographical, biometric, and transactional-to identify and
measure).
83. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Interim Report
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.42006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
TransnationalCorporations/PagesReports.aspx (locate document under list) ("[Tihe
mandate is intended to be primarily evidence based, and also to provide conceptual
clarification where called for or otherwise required.").
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connected to the global mass of individuals. Until that obstacle is
overcome, the issue of representation remains problematic at the
international level, the individual as an autonomous actor remains
unrepresented, and the legitimacy of those efforts around this mass
individual at the international evel remains in question.
III. ABSTRACTED TERRAINS
When one moves from the fractured territories of representation at
the international level back to the state as recipient and architect of
international norms, one enters a landscape of unbroken territory
composed of abstracted terrains of law and governance. That movement
also brings forward the problem of representation and the legitimacy of
acts, but in this context, the difficulty centers on the object of
representation. If the development of an international architecture, or
architectures, of human rights norms consolidates the "global"
individual as an object of such norm-making, the same trend
simultaneously produces abstracted terrains within the state of
multiple masters, which political representatives may not be able to
serve simultaneously.
The development of an international architecture for business and
human rights has changed both the source of a representative's fidelity
and the identity of those she represents. As enterprises become
territories of law systems, and as the expression of popular will becomes
subsumed in law and norm to international governance regimes,
individuals become subsumed within communities that increasingly
serve as a vehicle through which individual rights and interventions
may be realized in the international sphere.8 4 Just as the individual
poses a challenge for representational egitimacy at international-level
norm-making sites, so the increasing authority of international norms
poses a challenge for representational legitimacy within the state, now
transformed from an apparatus for the realization of popular
sovereignty into a fractured terrain of balkanized regimes of general
will. Here again, individuals are abstracted into objects. But in contrast
to the representational issues in the international sphere, at the
national level that abstracting process is undertaken in the service of a
transformation of representational obligation from the polity to higher-
order entities, whose interests may trump those of the polity itself.
8 5
84. The conceptual origins are well forecasted in CARR, supra note 20.
85. Cf. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human
Rights Norms Into Domestic Practices: An Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999)
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The UNGP also point to the ways in which that focus on the state as
the central element of a governance framework for business and human
rights has also produced perverse effects.8 6 In particular, the greater
focus on the state as a center of the global project of managing economic
behavior with respect to its human rights impacts has effectively
decentered the state and produced a profound challenge to its integrity
and coherence as a unit of governance through law.87 The more that the
global structures of law focus on the state, the more profoundly the state
disintegrates as a unitary site for law grounded in popular
representation reflecting popular preferences and subject to popular
accountability.
As part of this institutional focus on the state in the UNGP, the
Working Group has devoted substantial resources to its toolkit of
National Action Plans (NAPs).88 The Working Group recommended that
governments follow four underlying principles in developing their
National Action Plans: (1) focus on adverse human rights impacts, (2)
focus on methods to address these adverse impacts, (3) identify a
regulatory mix of mandatory and voluntary and national and
international measures, and (4) take into account differential impacts
on vulnerable groups.
8 9
The NAPs suggest the scope of the challenge to conventional
democratic representation within states represented by the UNGP NAP
project. The first touches on the way that the UNGP, through the NAPs,
evince a turn toward the acceptance of a hierarchy of law in which
national law is always subordinate to international law and perhaps
international norms (in the societal sphere at least). The second touches
on the efforts to legitimate and expand the extraterritorial power of the
state. Both tendencies spring directly from the Guiding Principles
themselves.90
(describing the socialization process by which international norms are internalized and
implemented domestically).
86. See generally Larry Cati Backer, The 2nd U.N. Forum on Busness [sic] and Human
Rights Live Streaming and Thoughts on Trends in Managing Business Behaviors, LAW AT
THE END OF THE DAY (Dec. 03, 2013, 5:59 AM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/
the-2nd-un-forum-on-busness-and-human.html (offering thoughts and comments on the
2013 U.N. Forum on Business and Human Rights held in Geneva, Switzerland).
87. Cf. Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented
States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1014, 1018 (1997)
(arguing that a growing fragmentation of the classical liberal internationalist system has
shifted states from government to governance).
88. See U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, Guidance on National
Action Plans on Business and Human Rights (Dec. 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/BusinessUNWG_%20NAPGuidance.pdf.
89. Id. at iii.
90. See Guiding Principles on Business, supra note 7, at 3-12.
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Ironically, this focus, contemplated under the UNGP,91 may
transform the state from a unitary site for the application of law
constrained by principles of popular representational democracy,92 into
an abstracted terrain in which law is partitioned within the state among
distinct categories of legal objects, each distinctly represented through
state officials ostensibly obliged to their polities. The effect is to
acknowledge both the primacy of international obligation, the law of
contract applied to international agreements, and the possibility that
such contracts can abstract and divide the terrains of national territory,
placing portions of these abstracted terrains beyond the reach of the
polity.
Additionally, the promotion of extraterritoriality (now quite
fashionable among certain influential sectors of internationalist elites),
even under the guise of furthering the international soft-law agenda of
devices like the UNGP,93 also contributes to the abstraction of national-
territorial cohesion and decenters the representational heart of national
governance.94 Yet the approach will further the move toward
institutionalizing the hierarchy of states,95 and may displace national
law with the determinations of foreign states within abstracted portions
of national activity. In this way, extraterritoriality effectively short-
circuits the foundational representational relationship between the
governed and their elected officials, interposing the domestic policy
preferences of the people of a different polity,96 or the preferences of a
91. The UNGP are concerned with policy coherence, but in that context note the power
of international agreements to subvert expressions of the national will through legislation.
See Guiding Principles on Business, supra note 7, at 11 ("States should maintain adequate
domestic policy space to meet their human rights obligations when pursuing business-
related policy objectives with other States or business enterprises, for instance through
investment treaties or contracts."); id. at 8 ("States should exercise adequate oversight in
order to meet their international human rights obligations when they contract with, or
legislate for, business enterprises to provide services that may impact upon the enjoyment
of human rights.").
92. See, e.g., JOSHUA COHEN, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD
POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE, 18-19 (Alan P. Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds.,
1989); Bernard Manin et al., On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY
338, 358-62 (1987).
93. Guiding Principles on Business, supra note 7.
94. The Commentary to UNGP Principle 2 suggests a policy basis for
extraterritoriality. See Guiding Principles on Business, supra note 7, at 4 ('The reasons
include ensuring predictability for business enterprises by providing coherent and
consistent messages, and preserving the State's own reputation.").
95. See Larry Catd Backer, Economic Globalization Ascendant and The Crisis of the
State: Four Perspectives on the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, 17
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 141, 156 (2006).
96. See TURAN KAYAOGLU, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: SOVEREIGNTY AND
EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN, THE OTToMAN EMPIRE, AND CHINA 191-92 (reprt. 2011).
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foreign polity for a particular reading of international law.97 Where such
extraterritorial application is made effective only outside the
jurisdiction of the state projecting its laws outward, then the disconnect
between law and polity is complete.
98
The extraterritorial application of domestic law or of an
international normative architecture situated above domestic legal
regimes is one manifestation of a general pattern of abstracting national
terrains in the broader context of which business operates in and across
the national territories of states. By its division of national territory into
functionally differentiated regulatory terrains, extraterritoriality
challenges the representational connection between polity and national
representative with delegitimating effect.99 One can understand these
sites of regulation within a national territory as consisting of, in
addition to domestic law, enterprise self-regulation, regulation through
nongovernmental organizations, extraterritorial regulation, bilateral
regulation, and multilateral regulation. Each is briefly considered in
turn.
Enterprise self-regulation follows from the increasing autonomy of
MNEs from the possibility of control through the application of the
domestic law of any one state to all of its operations and activities.100
Within the global operations of enterprises which operate across borders
in integrated supply chains, the possibility of creating substantial
governance operations within the enterprise and among its various
units produces the stability of regulatory coherence that is the hallmark
of legal systems.0 1 These produce a new form of territorial integrity
that functions much like (and across) the national territories of
conventional states,102 but within which states and their domestic legal
orders form only variable components.103 It is to the harmonization of
97. See MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY 151 (2011).
98. See generally Sara L. Seck, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY, Emerging Market
Multinational Home States, Extractive Industries, and the Inside/Outside Problem (July 2,
2015, 4:53 PM), http://icbackerblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/sara-seck-on-emerging-market.
html.
99. Cf. David Plotke, Representation is Democracy, 4 CONSTELLATIONS 19, 32 (1997).
100. See, e.g., Jean-Philippe Rob6, Multinational Enterprises: The Constitution of a
Pluralistic Legal Order, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 45, 48-49 (Gunther Teubner
ed., 1997).
101. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 69, at 1752-54; Larry CatA Backer, Multinational
Corporations as Objects and Sources of Transnational Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 499, 504 (2008).
102. See generally BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON
SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 208-15, 257-301 (2d ed. 2002).
103. See Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 4 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
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these enterprise-specific governance territories that the second pillar of
the UNGP was directed.10 4 Every enterprise carries its own domestic
legal order on its back and within its supply chain.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also project regulatory
power within states through the exercise of an authority to regulate the
standards for production processes.10 5 That regulation takes two forms.
The first includes the establishment of normative standards for
production, including self-regulatory standards,10 6  environmental
standards,107 and corporate social responsibility standards.1 08 The
second includes NGOs that audit and certify transactions,109 or
operations,1 0 in accordance with substantive standards of conduct. On
occasion, civil society and transnational economic enterprises negotiate
hybrid certification regimes that are imposed on transnational economic
activities-the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme being among the
most well known.1 These suggest the power of private actors as
representative organs of distinct transnational communities negotiating
governance structures with national effect. Yet that very process also
highlights the absence of much national will to embed such structures
within the state apparatus.
11 2
Extraterritorial legislation can sometimes transform enterprises
into national territory which is projected into all states in which the
enterprise operates.11 3 It commonly applies to specific regulatory
104. See Larry CatA Backer, On the Evolution of the United Nations' "Protect-Respect-
Remedy" Project: The State, the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance
Context, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 37, 74 (2011).
105. See, e.g., Jennifer Clapp, The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance:
ISO 14000 and the Developing World, in THE BUSINESS OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE 223 (David L. Levy & Peter J. Newell, eds., 2005).
106. See generally Structure and Governance, Int'l Org. for Standardization [ISO],
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/about-governance.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
107. See generally INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION [ISO], Environmental Management
Systems - Requirements With Guidance For Use, IS014001 (2d ed., Nov. 15, 2004).
108. See generally INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION [ISO], Guidance on Social
Responsibility, IS026000 (Nov. 1, 2010).
109. See generally Who We Are, FAIRTRADEUSA.ORG, http://www.fairtradeusa.org/about-
fair-trade-usa/who-we-are.
110. See generally FAIR LABOR ASS'N, About Us, FAIRLABOR.ORG, http://www.fairlabor.
org/about-us-0.
111. See generally Virginia Haufler, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An
Innovation in Global Governance and Conflict Prevention, 89 J. Bus. ETHICS (SUPP. 4:
PEACE THROUGH COMMERCE: A MULTISECTORAL APPROACH) 403 (2009).
112. See id. at 404.
113. See, e.g., In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d 875, 887 (W.D. Wis. 2000)
("Congress extends domestic jurisdiction to extraterritorial conduct only when the
plaintiffs have been injured by the effects on the domestic market. This is consistent with
the main purpose of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, which was to protect
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areas,114 but may also subject a foreign enterprise to jurisdiction
relating to the activities of a related member.15 Thus, an enterprise
may be subject to the law of the state in which it operates with respect
to some aspects of operation, but subject to the laws of another state
with respect to other aspects. The American Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act provides a good example of this sort of multijurisdictional effect.
116
Bilateral and multilateral regulation provide additional bases for
distinguishing the legal treatment of people operating within a national
territory on the basis of the coverage of each. The principal effect of
bilateral treaties is to substitute international for national law covering
a distinct subset of national actors, thus distinguishing their treatment
from the rest of the polity. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) permit
variations in the construction of domestic legal orders within a domestic
legal order-internationalizing part while leaving other parts
untouched."17 While most are similar, there are differences among them,
creating the possibilities for distinct treatment in some respects among
the investment activities falling within their scope. While many BITs
provide for "national treatment," some provide for preferential
treatment of incoming investment, or "most-favored-nation"
treatment."18 The effect, of course, is that investments covered under
American exporters from liability under the Sherman Act where the exporters were
operating abroad.").
114. For an example of competition law, see, for example, M. Sornarajah, The
Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws: Conflict and Compromise, 31 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 127 (1982) (as applied to an instance involving Commonwealth countries).
115. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948); but see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133
S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
116. See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977).
117. See generally Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions:
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 107 (2005)
(demonstrating how the substitution effect of BITs may reduce governance quality of
domestic legal orders of developing states).
118. A number of states have produced model BITs from out of which negotiations
usually proceed. See, e.g., Agreement Between Canada and ------ For the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, ITALAW.COM (2004), http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-
FIPA-model-en.pdf; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between
the Republic of Colombia and __ , ITALAW.coM (2004), http://italaw.com/documents/
inv_model-bit-colombia.pdf; Draft Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of
France and the Government of the Republic of (...) on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, ITALAW.cOM (2006), http://italaw.com/documentsModelTreaty
France2006.pdf; Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and ............
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection on Investments, ITALAW.COM
(2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ital025.pdf; Agreement Between
the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of (...) for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, ITALAW.COM (2003), http:/www.italaw.comsites/
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the treaty in the latter case will be subject to some rules distinct from
those available to local investments, including remedial rights against
the host state. Ironically, in representing the interests of investors, such
treaties create an environment in which states may be constrained in
the protection of the human rights of their own citizens within their own
territory.119  International representation of transnational
constituencies, then, may envelop and overwhelm the traditional
politically sourced representational element in the constitution of states,
where, in the hierarchies of political orders, states cease to occupy the
apex of power.
The challenges of the new representational architecture of elected
state officials was exposed quite clearly in the wake of the collapse of
the Rana Plaza factory building in Bangladesh in 2013.120 Immediately
after the collapse, the state moved to action, arresting the building
owner, the factory owners, and officials who might have violated law in
the context of building approvals and inspections. But reform and
response to the collapse was another matter. The scope and direction of
response were, to a large extent, directed by the MNEs with stakes in
Bangladeshi production chains, sometimes in coordination with
international organizations, principally the International Labor
Organization (ILO). These enterprises sometimes coordinated their
efforts, but sometimes broke up into camps competing for control of
reform and for influence with the Bangladeshi state. The two most
influential camps were the Accord and the Alliance for Bangladesh
Worker Safety.121 Both focused on the development and implementation
default/files/archive/italO26.pdf; Treaty Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of lCountry] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, ITALAW.COM (2012), http://www.italaw.comlsites/default/files
archive/ita1028.pdf.
119. See, e.g., LUKE ERIC PETERSON & KEVIN R. GRAY, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND IN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 3 (2003), available at http://www.iisd.org/sites
defaultlfiles/pdf/2003/investment int humanrightsbits.pdf ("[T]here is evidence that
investment treaty arbitration has been threatened against the South African Government
in relation to its policy efforts to promote greater racial diversity in management and
ownership positions in the South African economy."); id. at 8-9 ("Some South African BITs
do contain exceptions which shelter certain forms of human rights-inspired legislation
which might affect foreign investors. However, these provisions are very limited in scope -
providing an exception only to one of more than a dozen investment treaty provisions.").
120. Discussed in Larry CatA Backer, Are Supply Chains Transnational Legal Orders?
What We Can Learn From the Rana Plaza Factory Building Collapse, 1 UC IRVINE J.
INT'L, TRANSNAT'L, COMP. L. (forthcoming 2016).
121. The Alliance consisted of mostly U.S. enterprises with production chain
connections with Bangladesh. It was organized as a partnership among enterprises
working together through a loosely based organizational structure. See About The Alliance
For Bangladesh Worker Safety, ALLIANCE FOR BANGLADESH WORKER SAFETY,
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of new standards for building inspection and safety. Both also provided
financial and technical assistance for factory and building owners
affected by their standard-setting-those with connections to global
production chains. Both worked with and through the Bangladeshi
state, which embraced their approach to inspection and standards. This
produced an odd re-embedding of law within a state but grounded in the
representational obligation of nonstate actors working to benefit, but
not representing, Bangladeshi citizens in the interest of other global
orders,122 whose legitimacy remains contested.23 MNEs also formed the
so-called "Arrangement" under which compensatory payment was to be
made to claimants, funded by enterprises otherwise beyond the reach of
Bangladeshi courts.124  All of these efforts were informed by
international business and human rights standards that had been
incorporated into the global human rights governance frameworks of
these enterprises. Lastly, Bangladesh entered into agreements with the
European Union and the United States under which it agreed to
substantial changes in its labor law, labor policy, and safety and
building inspections to internationalize these areas in ways that suited
http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/who-we-are/about-the-alliance (last visited Nov.
9, 2015) ("The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety was founded by a group of North
American apparel companies and retailers and brands who have joined together to
develop and launch the Bangladesh Worker Safety Initiative, a binding, five-year
undertaking that will be transparent, results-oriented, measurable and verifiable with the
intent of improving safety in Bangladeshi ready-made garment (RMG) factories."). The
Accord consisted of mostly European and some U.S. enterprises. It was organized as a
more open organization, chaired by the ILO, and included space for engagement with local
and international civil society and public organizations. See ACCORD ON FIRE AND
BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, http://bangladeshaccord.org/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2015)
('The Accord is an independent, legally binding agreement between brands and trade
unions designed to work towards a safe and healthy Bangladeshi Ready-Made Garment
Industry. Our purpose is to enable a working environment in which no worker needs to
fear fires, building collapses, or other accidents that could be prevented with reasonable
health and safety measures.").
122. This has been viewed as both necessary and positive without any reference to the
consequence ither for legitimacy or representation. See, e.g., Janelle M. Diller, Pluralism
and Privatization in Transnational Labour Regulation: Experience of the International
Labour Organization, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 329
(Adelle Blackett & Anne Trebilcock, eds., 2015).
123. See Dorothe6 Baumann-Pauly et al., Closing Governance Gaps in Bangladesh's
Garment Industry - The Power and Limitations of Private Governance Schemes 7-17 (Mar.
12, 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2577535.
124. See Diller, supra note 122, at 337 ("The Arrangement is governed by a multi-
stakeholder Coordination Committee composed of the signatories (except for one
company). . . . The Committee has decided on methods for benefits calculation and
distribution, and set up an expert Claims Administration to process victims' claims in as
individualized an assessment as possible.").
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both the United States and the European Union.1 25 The most significant
changes were to Bangladeshi labor law. The foundation for these
changes was international standards now transposed into Bangladeshi
law through the intervention of two foreign states representing the
interests of workers, including those of Bangladesh. Law and
representation now take on a multiple set of quite distinct meanings
within the globalized structures of governance-one in which the direct
connection between represented and representative becomes more fluid
and indirect. With this fluidity and indirectness, the connection between
representation and accountability, a touchstone of representation's
legitimacy-enhancing function, is as dissipated as the concept of
representation in lawmaking itself.
As a consequence, when one looks at the landscape of law in
Bangladesh after the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory, one does not
see a single domestic legal order coherently and rationally applied to
everyone operating within the national territory. Instead, one sees
something quite variegated. At the bottom are those firms, individuals,
and operations that have no connection to globalized chains of
production. For these, the alpha and omega of law and governance is
delineated by the traditional boundaries of the state and its
operationalization within Bangladeshi democratic structures. But
beyond that, governance gets more complex and representation loses its
connection to the polity. Competing alliances of multinational
enterprises develop inspection standards and train national inspectors,
who oversee compliance with these standards but only at factories
connected to production chains of alliance participants. The state
embraces the inspection standards and proffers its officials for training.
Compensation for survivors is overseen by a coalition of entities, itself
overseen by an international organization and funded from abroad.
Working conditions are set by MNEs with respect to workers in their
production chains, but otherwise are set by the state. Finally, however,
it is a multilateral group that reaches an agreement for a legislative
program and for guidance over the direction of policy to be undertaken
within Bangladesh. It is not clear that the Bangladeshi legislature has
much room to maneuver here, nor that the Bangladeshi electorate was
engaged with this process. Bangladeshi officials, legislative and
executive, both sought out and cooperated with these efforts. The
consequence was legitimacy for Bangladesh within the international
community, but perhaps less so within its territory. The consequence for
Bangladesh is a state characterized by a multiplicity reflected in the
125. See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Joint Statement by Eur. Comm'nIHRVP & US
Agencies on the Second Anniversary of the Rana Plaza Disaster in Bangl. (Apr. 24, 2015),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-STATEMENT-15-4849_en.htm.
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divided representation of its officials. This is not the relational structure
of a traditional democratic state, even one imperfectly operated. This is
something quite new. Here, it is no longer clear how tightly
representatives are now connected, or whether they are connected at all,
to the individuals who elected them and to whom they might otherwise,
and in another era, have been solely accountable.
From the perspective of representation, then, something curious
appears to have emerged. One might conceive of this as representational
anarchy-the possibility of representation unmoored to either territory
or an ordering scheme of representational hierarchy. It is not merely a
matter of misalignment-something of a standard and pragmatic
approach to the issue, in line with the primacy of economic modeling of
relationships through law. 26 Rather, from the perspective of political
legitimacy, polycentricity and misalignment in the representational
legitimacy of actors produce what ought to be understood as classical
anarchy127-a system without a centering point, without an ordering
authority, but distinguishable from chaos-the absence of systemicity.
Yet that absence of centering principle-the state-produces a crisis of
legitimacy, and thus an explanation for the reluctance of states and
other actors to rely on emerging governance orders projected inward in
ways that weaken the political cohesion of receiving governance organs.
And yet, within the polycentric anarchy is the new multilayered
universe of governance-the effects of which are felt within states
though there may be little direct connection with states, and which may
represent the interest of communities for which accountability rests
wholly without the state. The people of a state, in this construct, are
submerged within the internationalized abstracted citizen, and the
representation of this globalized abstracted individual is no longer tied
to the population of a state or its political systems. Legitimacy and
representation are diffused, but does this represent the will of the
represented? The internationalized individual whom transnational
actors now purport to serve is a construct of data (the object of human
rights regimes). Yet a curious transformation occurs in the context of
the relationship between transnational actors and the abstracted
individuals they serve. As the example from Bangladesh intimates, civil
society, international organization, enterprises, and developed states
with an obligation to serve all actors within global production chains
126. See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 747 (2014).
127. From the Greek "anarkhos," meaning "without head or chief." Entries 7756-7758 of
119553, THE ONLINE LIDDELL-SCorr-JONES GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON, THESAURUS
LINGUAE GRAECAE, http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/lsj/#eid=7757&context=lsj&action=hw-
list-click (last visited Nov. 9, 2015).
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increasingly appear to substitute themselves for the polity, for
individual citizens, in the operation of representative democracy within
developing states. Democratic representation appears to have lost its
individual character, as political rights of individuals now appear
increasingly exercised through representational institutional actors.128
That is a curious transformation indeed!
CONCLUSION
Representation has served as the foundation of modern theories of
democratic legitimacy-at least for states. As states become increasingly
decentered, both from law and norm-making, the legitimating
foundation of representation has also been challenged. This essay has
explored two distinct forms of that challenge at the center of current
approaches to the internationalization of human rights regimes
governing behaviors of economic activity within and among states. The
first touches on the transformation of the representative. The second
touches on the transformation of the state. Together these challenges are
transforming representation from a simple and direct relationship
between electorate and representative, to one complicated by the
obligations of the representative to represent not just the electorate but
also the mass of supranational entities and norm-systems to which the
state now obliges itself. With this transformation, the legitimacy of the
underlying institutions within which representational power is
exercised, has been weakened or transformed.
But to the extent transformed, it is not clear that legitimacy
grounded in representation and accountability survive. Both forms
present significant challenges to legitimacy-based conventional
principles of representative democracy and popular sovereignty. Those
challenges are particularly acute within the international sphere, where
an increasing governance power is in search of the legitimacy of
democratic structure, which continues to elude it. In that sphere, the
issue of representation turns on the disconnect between the universe of
representatives and the mass of represented. States, civil society, and
enterprises inadequately represent the global mass of individuals who
tend to be the object of international normative efforts, especially in the
field of business and human rights. It is as acute within states, where
an increasing splintering of legal jurisdiction, in part the result of the
128. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, From Guiding Principles to Interpretive
Organizations: Developing a Framework for Applying the UNGPs to Disputes That
Institutionalizes the Advocacy Role of Civil Society (Penn. St. U. Dickinson Sch. L., Legal
Stud. Res. Paper No. 40, 2014) (detailing the current threats to a workable transnational
order compatible with the realities of contemporary governance).
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partial projections of international law and norms within states, has
severed the traditional connection between representative and polity.
Representatives may be elected by the people, but they increasingly owe
loyalty to others who constrain their ability to serve their polities.
Taken together, these trends suggest a period of instability and
transformation of the state, the enterprise, and the individual within
the context of a dynamic, transforming notion of representational
foundations of democratic legitimacy within and beyond states.
